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The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Critique of the Contemporary Law of the Sea, by P. Sreenivasa Rao. Cambridge,
Mass., MIT Press, 1975.
The Law of the Sea needs all the help it can get. The massive
United Nations-sponsored effort to revise the law that governs
70 percent of our planet is fast becoming the victim of ideological
stalemate, superficial journalism, inadequate attention at high
levels of government, and the sheer fatigue that is bound to plague
any effort combining 150 nations and 400 to 600 separate treaty
articles. Add to these troubles the intense political pressures.
that surround particular issues in most countries, the inchoate
notion of the "common heritage of mankind" that bubbles.
through the deliberations, and the new political alignments that
the negotiations have generated, and you have a conception of'
the predicament of that immense enterprise known as the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III). You also have a better understanding of the task confronting any "critique of the contemporary law of the sea." Both
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erudition and imagination must be tempered by an informed
grasp of the political context.
Dr. Rao's book went to press soon after the first substantive
session of UNCLOS III at Caracas in 1974. As of this writing, the
fourth such session (August-September 1976) concluded recently
in New York after an especially disappointing showing. In contrast to the substantial progress of the intervening period - which
produced a skeleton-like "Single Negotiating Text" - the latest
New York session served mainly to illustrate the strength of the
impediments to further progress.
Above all, the deep seabed negotiations in Committee I retain their ominous prominence and intractability - despite the
relatively minor significance of deepsea minerals when compared
with the larger range of ocean uses, and despite a series of major
concessions by the United States without real reciprocity (concessions that have attracted considerable opposition in the U.S.
Senate and private industry, sometimes unfortunately extending
to the Conference in toto). Somehow, the notion that the seabeds should belong to mankind as a whole has captured the
imagination of the developing world - and many in the developed - to such an extent that anything short of total control
by the former is regarded as a "sell-out" of the "common heritage." What began as an admirable sentiment in search of political
expression has become a questionable slogan in need of political
compromise.
The two years of negotiations might be taken as confirming
Senator Lee Metcalf's early justification for unilateral U.S. legislation (which Rao roundly condemns) that "some of the more
militant nations.., would deny U.S. industry effective access to
the minerals of the deep seabed."' The possibility that more
moderate members of the "Group of 77" might seize the initiative
from these "militants" at the recent New York session apparently did not materialize. At the same time, U.S. emphasis
on cultivating the latter group to the exclusion of others - including our interested Allies - may not have helped matters.
Eventually, it may require negotiations at the highest international levels to resolve this dispute - that is, if interim U.S.
legislation does not kill all prospects of a multilateral solution.
Rao also could not foresee the importance of the bloc known
as "landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states" (Land1. Rao, pp. 91-92.
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locked -

GDS) .2 With an effective voting third of the participat-

ing countries, the GDS group may ultimately exercise a veto on
treaty outcomes. That they also represent one of the strangest
coalitions in the history of international negotiations greatly complicates the problem of satisfying each of them that a comprehensive oceans treaty is in their interest. However, this is the
one area in which some progress was made at the most recent
session (on matters of shared access in the economic zones of
adjacent states).
Finally, the strength of the pressure for coastal state extensions of jurisdiction was probably not foreseeable even two years
earlier. Whereas the idea of a 200-mile economic zone with 12mile territorial seas was only slowly conceded by many countries,
including our own, today the United States must fight hard to
retain the status as "high seas" of the waters between 12 and 200
nautical miles. Likewise, the idea of international jurisdiction
over continental shelf areas beyond 200 miles was the casualty of
vast coastal country's claims out to the limits of the continental
margins, with certain key countries advocating the most expansive possible definitions of that limit.
It is hardly a fatal weakness of Dr. Rao's study that he did
not entirely foresee the future; in fact, he mentions each of these
issues and his judgment is generally reliable. But the political
history of the last two years of UNCLOS III does highlight the
problem that confronts all analyses of contemporary law of the
sea: that of weighing the issues against each other and establishing certain criteria of importance for distinguishing the most
critical from the remainder. It is true, of course, that priorities
will be different according to where one sits; but so long as such
complex negotiations are depicted by analysts as an undifferentiated whole, the necessary compromises will not emerge and
the lesser interests will not give way to the greater. Dr. Rao is
not unmindful of this need for proportion, but in purporting to
be comprehensive in viewpoint, while limiting his substantive
coverage in execution, the result is not the balanced, integrated
portrayal of the stakes in oceans law that we need.
Dr. Rao's organization is a bit confusing. He delimits for
himself "the problems relating to marine mineral resource exploitation," then repeatedly but inadequately departs from that
limitation and eventually concludes by tacking on an otherwise
2. See Rao, pp. 3, 70-73.
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very thoughtful chapter on "Security and Disarmament in the
Sea." That chapter, in turn, has an excellent discussion of the
problem of "innocent passage" for military vessels, but elsewhere
we find little reference to the problems of straits passage or pollution controls for non-military ships, even though the transportation of ocean minerals, especially oil and gas from the continental
shelf, is one of the major problems "relating to marine mineral
resource exploitation." Also lacking in this context is a discussion of the strategic (security) significance of access to such
mineral resources - a significance hardly lost on the developed
countries. Finally, there is no treatment of another major issue,
the impact of marine mineral production on land-based producers,
which has proved especially serious in recent negotiations. In
short, Dr. Rao's framework has not satisfactorily mapped out
the range of issues he needs to address.
Such omissions are hardly unique to this study. In many
respects, Dr. Rao is better in setting the stage than most other
recent commentators on the law of the sea, particularly if his
lengthy footnotes are consulted carefully. The chapter on "Competing Uses of the Sea" is a good example of the holistic perspective to which he aspires. It is also much too easy for a
reviewer merely to criticize gaps in someone else's coverage.
For two reasons, however, I respectfully urge Dr. Rao to give us
a later and fuller study of the contemporary law of the sea.
The first reason is a methodological one. Dr. Rao opens the
book with explicit mention of his debts to the "policy-oriented
approach" of Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell at the
Yale Law School. Indeed, this reviewer first heard him present
his views on deep seabed resources in a McDougal-Lasswell seminar of 1970, when they formed part of the dissertation on which
this book is based. Many readers will recognize in Dr. Rao's
organization of the issues the general framework of McDougal
and Burke's The Public Order of the Oceans (1962). 3 To some
extent Rao's book acts as a kind of supplement to the McDougalBurke study, which gave relatively little attention to the deep
seabed mineral issue. However, comparison with that work will
also show that it is difficult to take McDougal halfway on matters
of organization. One strives either to be truly comprehensive in
discussing the context and interrelationship of the issues, or to
3. To some extent, Rao's book acts as a kind of supplement to the McDougalBurke study, which gave relatively little attention to the deep seabed mineral issue.
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delimit the boundaries of the study carefully and stick to them.
Barring those alternatives, the policy-oriented framework had
better be dispensed with. Otherwise, it conveys an aura of
thoroughness without the requisite performance.
The second reason that a fuller study is needed relates to the
contemporary nature of the law of the sea itself. In part because
of UNCLOS III, which has tied the entire package of issues into
a political bundle, and in part because of the inherent nature of
the oceans regime, these issues are in fact virtually inextricable
for the time being. The Law of the Sea is now a problem of
international politics. Compromises on one set of issues are
necessarily tied to bargains on another set in the interests of
achieving consensus on the whole. Separate consideration and
resolution of each issue is simply not the contemporary strategy.
If the effort at a comprehensive agreement should fail, many of
these understandings would undoubtedly fall apart. Even then,
the interrelation of the various issues would have to be reconsidered in a comprehensive and balanced fashion by each country
and by regional groupings. For that reason, policy-oriented discussions of the law of the sea should deal with the issues as they
have evolved in a comprehensive context. It is only in such a
context that political proportion can be maintained and effective
trade-offs negotiated. Leaving out important issues distorts the
larger picture.
We are currently entering a period in which large multilateral
bargains will repeatedly have to be struck. The UNCLOS III
approach admittedly may not work. But the alternative is probably greatly increased conflict, waste, and pollution in the oceans
and a general loss of control over human affairs on some twothirds of the planet.
Frederick S. Tipson*
4. Rao, p. 203.
* Associate Director and Lecturer in Law, Center for Oceans Law and Policy,
University of Virginia.

